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This paper studies the design of incentives in a large federal (U.S.) organization that
provides job training to the economically disadvantaged. State boundaries segment the
organization. Each state supervises the training agencies, or local decision makers, that
are located within its boundaries. Training agencies are heterogeneous in the sense that
they manage budgets of di®erent sizes. Training agencies' budgets are determined pri-
marily by the density of the population of disadvantaged that live in their jurisdictions.
Each state distributes an award pot to provide incentives to the pool of training
agencies it oversees subject to two constraints. First, the awards cannot be negative.
Training agencies are guaranteed a ¯xed budget and receive the awards on top of that
budget. This constraint is similar to the limited liability constraint found in the incentive
literature (Sappington, 1983). The second constraint is that the award function has to
be fully-funded. By this, we mean that the sum of the rewards cannot be greater than a
¯xed award pot. Tournaments are examples of fully-funded awards.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the limited liability and
fully-funded constraints matter. From a theoretical point of view, there are good reasons
to believe that they should. To see that, recall that the driving force behind performance
incentives is that the way the principal stimulates e®ort is by creating a reward gap
between high and low levels of agent performance. Under moral hazard, this implies
that the agent will sometimes receive less and other times more than its contribution.
Limited liability constraints, however, restrict the ability to give less to the agent than
its contribution. Similarly, fully-funded constraints limit the principal's ability to give
rewards that are greater than the agent's contribution. This upper-bound on the rewards
together with the lower-bound on punishment due to limited liability may reduce the
maximum award gap and the possibility to e±ciently provide performance incentives.
In investigating whether these constraints matter, this paper proceeds in two steps.
The ¯rst step it to model the contractual features described above. The incentive literature
has overlooked situations where fully funded and limited liability constraints interplay
with the feature that agents are heterogeneous. The model asks three sets of questions.
1The ¯rst set explores the relation between the agents' performances and their awards.
What does the optimal incentive scheme look like? Should the awards be independent
across agents as in a piece rate system or should the amount agents receive depend on
the performance of other agents, as in a tournament incentive scheme? The second set of
questions is speci¯c to the feature that agents are heterogeneous. How does the optimal
award function depend on the number of agents and on their relative sizes? Should
awards be proportional to budget sizes? Or should smaller agents receive a disproportional
fraction of the award? Third and most importantly, does the optimal contract achieve
the e±cient level of e®ort? Do the limited liability and fully funded constraints bind?
The model predicts that the limited liability and the fully-funded constraints should
bind and reduce the e®ectiveness of incentives. This should be even more pronounced
in states where the agents' sizes are more heterogeneous. We show that when agents
are very heterogeneous, the smaller agents will typically exert ine±ciently high level of
e®orts. We also derive the optimal incentive contract and characterize its properties.
Some of these properties suggest simple predictions on how budget sizes, award amounts
and performance outcomes should vary within and across states. We also ¯nd that the
optimal award is characterized by group incentives. An agent's payo® is dependent on
the performance of her peers even though their performances may not be statistically
related. The reason for the optimality of group incentives here comes from the need to
cross-subsidize awards in order to increase the award gap between high and low levels of
performance.
The second step is to test if the predictions suggested by the optimal contract hold
in the federal job training organization that is our case study. Our empirical strategy
is to compare performance awards and performance outcomes across states that manage
di®erent pools of agents. The empirical analysis uncovers three ¯ndings. First, those
agents that are small relative to their state average receive disproportionally larger awards.
We also ¯nd some mixed evidence that they perform better. Second, performance awards
depend on absolute performance outcomes but also on performance outcomes relative to
other agents in the state. Third, we ¯nd some evidence that performance outcomes are
lower in states that are more heterogeneous. The evidence is broadly consistent with
2the predictions of the model. It suggests that it is more di±cult to provide performance
incentives in states that are more heterogeneous because the fully-funded and limited
liability constraints are more costly in those states.
The theoretical part of this paper contributes to the contract literature. Following the
early work of Lazear and Rosen (1981) on tournaments as a means to provide incentives,
some authors have recently studied the speci¯c problem of allocating ¯xed award pots
among contestants (e.g. Krishna and Morgan (1998) and Moldovanu and Sela (1999))
but these work do not assume limited liability on the part of the agent. As mentioned
above, Sappington as well as Demski et al. (1988) study the restriction imposed by limited
liability constraints but in a framework where the agent receives some private information
after contracting. More recently, Innes (1990), and Kim (1997) considered the contractual
restrictions imposed under limited liability but in a single agent framework and without
the fully funded constraint.
On the empirical side, this work belongs to the empirical literature on the provision of
incentive in organizations. See Prendergast (1999) for a recent survey of that literature.
Another way to interpret our results is as a test of whether government bureaucrats write
contracts that are consistent with the optimal incentive contracts predicted by incentive
theory. There is some evidence that ¯rms design optimal incentive contracts (Prendergast
reviews studies of bonus, relative performance, and tournament) but to our knowledge,
no one has yet asked whether government organizations also do so.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section summarizes the key characteristics
of the incentive system we study in the empirical application. This will be the starting
point to motivate the model which is presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives some
implications but the proofs are deferred to the Appendix. Section 5 tests some of the
model's implication in a large training organization and Section 6 concludes.
32 The JTPA Incentive System
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 created what was until the late 90's the
largest federal employment and training program serving the disadvantaged.1 The core of
our empirical work focuses on ¯scal years 1985 and 1986. In these years, the JTPA annual
budget was approximately $4 billion and it was serving nearly one million people. JTPA
is highly decentralized: job training is carried out by more than 600 semi-autonomous
sub-state training agencies. The JTPA bureaucracy is unusual for many reasons but one
will be of special interest for this study: Instead of a rigid, comprehensive set of rules
that regulate bureaucratic conduct, the JTPA organization is driven by a set of incentive
systems that in°uence outcomes.2
JTPA gave the responsibility to individual states to design and administer the local
incentive systems. There are 51 incentive systems in our data set corresponding to 50
individual states and the District of Columbia. Each incentive system rewards a pool of
training agencies. In ¯scal years 1985 and 1986, we have for each incentive system (read
state) data on the number and the size of the training agencies, or more simply agents,
and on the agents' performances outcomes and awards.3
To motivate the model, we present some basic statistics on the number of agents
per state, and on the agents' budgets, awards and performances. The number of agents
varies across states. In fact, there are on average 11.9 agents per incentive systems with
a standard deviation of 11.0. The average agent's size also varies considerably across
incentive systems. Agents manage on average a budget of $3,084,309 but the standard
deviation in average budget across states is $3,254,630. This variation illustrates the fact
that the JTPA funds are allocated to the states by formula on the basis of the relative
size of their population that is eligible for training. Those states that have larger eligible
1For a description of JTPA see Johnston, 1987.
2For a description of the JTPA incentives see Courty and Marschke, 2000.
3The data on the agents' performance outcomes and performance standards used in this study come
from the JTPA Annual Survey Report (JASR). This report is compiled annually by the Department of
Labor. The award and budget were collected by SRI, International (SRI) and Berkeley Planning Asso-
ciates to evaluate for the National Council for Employment Policy the e±cacy of performance standards
in JTPA. See Dickenson, et al. (1988) for a description of the data. We thank Carol Romero of the
National Commission for Employment Policy for making these data available to us.
4population manage more and/or larger training agencies. Agents' budgets within a state
can also vary tremendously. The within-state variance in budgets is lower than $1m in
some states and as large as $10m in others. This, again, is due to the fact that each
training agency receives a share of its state's budget that is proportional to its fraction of
the state population that is eligible for JTPA training. Most importantly for our study,
this variation in the number of agents and in their budgets is exogenous since it depends
on the local density of population in need.
As an aside, note that this feature of agent heterogeneity prevails in government or-
ganizations where the sizes of the basic managerial entities are largely determined by
administrative boundaries. This implies that government organizations typically super-
vise pools of heterogeneous agents. In fact, this is the case in education (agents are
schools), health (hospitals) and many other government service organizations where some
experimentation with incentives has been tried (Dixit, 1999).
Next, we describe the performance outcomes. Before presenting some numbers, it may
be useful to describe the concept of performance measures and performance standards in
the JTPA organization. In ¯scal years 1985 and 1986, there were seven performance
measures and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) required that the States use them all.
There were four measures for the adult participants, and three for the youth participants.
Table 1 de¯nes the seven performance measures.
Each state in JTPA develops an incentive system based on the DOL-de¯ned measures
to reward its pool of training agencies. The states have considerable latitude in the
construction of the incentive scheme as long as awards are contingent on the achievement
of numerical standards de¯ning minimum acceptable level of performance. For non-cost
measures (see Table 1), agents receive awards if their outcomes exceed the corresponding
standards. For cost measures, on the other hand, agents receive awards if their outcomes
are exceeded by the corresponding standards.
The DOL sets performance standard benchmarks for each performance measure based
on the historic performance of other training centers in the system. For the non-cost
(cost) measures, the DOL sets the benchmark at the 25th (90th) percentile of the agent
performance nationwide for the previous two ¯scal years; this means that 75 (90) percent
5of agents in the previous two years would have attained the standard. The DOL o®ers
states a procedure for adjusting the each measure's benchmark by the characteristics
of the local labor market (e.g., the local unemployment rate) and by characteristics of
the agent's enrollee population (e.g., enrolee representation of welfare recipients). The
purpose of the adjustment procedure is to level the playing ¯eld so that agents are held
to standards that are appropriate to their local economic conditions and the kinds of
clients served. The states have discretion over the formulation of the standards, but most
states during the period under investigation adopted the same DOL formulae to control
for outside factors.4 Table 2 computes the fraction of agents who have exceeded the
performance standard and the average performance in excess of the standard (that is, the
actual performance outcome minus the standard) for the seven performance measures.
Table 2 shows that while most agents exceed the standard, their excess performances
vary considerably.
Finally, we present the award prizes. By mandate, a state's award pot is about seven
percent of the training budgets it supervises.5 Table 3 presents the mean and standard
deviation of the agents' awards, and of their awards per unit of budget. The award per
unit of budget varies across agents suggesting that the award funds are not allocated only
according to a proportional sharing rule. We also ¯nd (not reported here) that the level
of awards vary greatly across agents within a state rejecting a ¯xed sharing rule where
the award pots would be distributed equally across agents.
Although the awards vary greatly across agents, there are some important restrictions
on the award distribution. First, the awards have to be positive, meaning that the states
cannot reduce the agents' budgets following a poor performance. Second, the states
cannot spend more than the award budget even if all agents do exceptionally well: the
4See Heckman et al. (1997) for a general discussion on the use of performance standards in government
organizations.
5The JTPA funds are allocated in three sub-funds: 78 percent are set aside for training services, 6
percent are set aside for the incentive system and the remaining 16 percent are set aside for other special
services. The award fund as a fraction of total training budget is 7.1 percent (6/(78+6)) if one assumes
that all award funds are eventually distributed as training budget. The actual ¯gure should typically be
lower than 7.1 percent because some of the incentive set aside fund is spent to administrate the incentive
funds. In our data, the award as a fraction of budget also varies across states because some agents are
missing in some states. The fraction of award to budget will be greater than seven percent, for example,
when poorly performing agents are missing.
6award has to be fully-funded.6
3 The Model
The previous Section showed that budget sizes, performance outcomes, and award prizes
varied greatly both within and across incentive systems. One goal of this paper is to
investigate whether incentive theory can explains these variations. Our objective in this
Section is to provide a framework for structuring and motivating the empirical analysis.
In the core of this Section, we restrict to the simple design problem with only two agents.
To establish a comparison benchmark, we will also ignore scale e®ects in budget size.
Toward the end of this Section, we show how the main qualitative predictions generalize
to multi-agents and non-linear budget e®ects.
Agent i 2 I = f1;2g manages budget bi with b1 ¸ b2. Agent i has reservation
utility U(bi) = biU, and exerts e®ort ei at cost bic(ei) with c0, c00, and c000 positive and
c(0) = c0(0) = 0. The principal values e®ort ¼(bi;ei) = biei from agent i. Let W denote
the award pot for agents b1 and b2.7
Budget multiplies all the fundamental parameters of the model in a proportional fash-
ion. The cost and pro¯t functions say that e®ort is measured in e±ciency units. Under
no scale e®ect, e®ort should be understood as a measure of quality of managerial decision.
This framework suggests a simple comparison benchmark corresponding to the e±cient
(or ¯rst-best) levels of e®ort in the absence of moral hazard problems. The e±cient e®orts
maximize the weighted sum of e®orts b1e1 + b2e2 subject to the participation constraints
wi ¡bic(ei) ¸ biU for i 2 I and the budget constraint W ¸ w1 +w2 where wi is the wage




6States may be able to transfer some award fund from one ¯scal year to the other although there are
some constraints restricting the amount states can transfer. For simplicity, we will focus in the model
section on the polar case where the amount they can transfer is zero.
7As a side comment, we assumed that the award fund was ¯xed. This assumption simpli¯es the
analysis and does not really matter for our empirical application since the interest there is not on the
optimal award pot (W) but rather on the optimal award function to be de¯ned below. We could also solve
for the optimal award pot. This would just add another decision variable without much supplementary
insight for our application.
7where f = W
b1+b2 represents the award as a fraction of budget and we assume f ¡ U > 0
to guaranty that ee > 0. One should think of e®ort as an e±ciency multiplier in the
use of the budget. Both agents supply the same e®ort because they equally increase the
e±ciency of their budgets. Agent i's wage is equal to its relative share of total budget
bi
b1+b2W.
Next, consider the moral hazard case. In line with the moral hazard paradigm, we
assume that the principal cannot directly observe the agents' e®orts but observes only an
imperfect measure of performance. To simplify, we assume that the performance measure
can only take high or low values. Four performance outcomes may occur that we will
denote J = fhh;hl;lh;llg where performance outcome hl, for example, is interpreted as
agent one performing high and agent two low. Outcome j 2 J occurs with probability
pj(e1;e2) and agent i 2 I then receives w
j
i. To focus on the main issues, we will assume
a simple symmetric linear functional from for the joint probabilities. The symmetry and
linearity assumptions in addition to the condition that the probability that an agent
achieves a given level of performance does not depend on the other agent's e®ort (e.g.
d
de2(phh +phl) = 0) imply that phh(e1;e2) = khh +®e1 +®e2, phl(e1;e2) = khl +¯e1 ¡®e2,
plh(e1;e2) = klh ¡ ®e1 + ¯e2, and pll(e1;e2) = kll ¡ ¯e1 ¡ ¯e2 with ®;¯ > 0, and kj given
constants such that khl = klh and pj 2 [0;1] within the relevant e®ort ranges.








To focus on the main issues, we will assume that the agents are risk neutral.8 Agent i's
utility under the above award scheme is,
Ui(ei) = Wi(e1;e2) ¡ bic(ei):
The incentive compatibility constraint for agent i says that she chooses the level of
e®ort that maximizes her utility given the other agent's e®ort. The ¯rst order condition
8Under the strong participation constraints to be introduced below this assumption is not very re-
strictive since the agents are guaranteed their reservation utilities anyway.





The ¯rst order condition is su±cient because the agent's maximization problem is convex.
The next set of constraints says that the principal guaranties the agents their reservation
utility under every performance outcome. Stretching the contract literature's terminology,
we will call these constraints the strong participation constraints,
w
j
i ¡ bic(ei) ¸ biU (SPC
j
i);
for j 2 J and i 2 I. These participation constraints are stronger than the ones found
in the incentive literature, or weak participation constraints, saying that the agents are
better-o® participating on average,9
Ui(e) ¸ biU (WPCi):
The ¯nal set of constraints is new to this problem and will play an important role in
the analysis. These constraints say that the total award payments in any performance








for j 2 J. The strong budget constraints emerge, for example, when the incentive system
has to be fully funded so that the principal cannot transfer award funds from one contract
year to the other. They are the mirror image to the principal of what the strong partici-
pation constraints are to the agent. The strong budget constraints are stronger than the
standard budget constraint found in the incentive literature, or weak budget constraint
in this work, saying that the award cannot exceed on average the total award pot,
W ¸ W1(e1;e2) + W2(e1;e2) (WBC):
9The SPC as modelled here are a strong version of the limited liability constraint found in the literature
saying that the agent's utility has to be greater than a ¯xed constant that could be lower than the agent's
reservation utility. SPC occur in practice when the principal needs to overcome the agent's resistance to
the introduction of explicit incentives. The principal uses SPC to reassure the agent that she will not
lose-out under the new compensation contract (e.g. Lazear, 1999).
9In the analysis Section, we will pay special attention to two incentive mechanisms that
have received much attention in the contract literature and that are commonly used in
practice: piece rate awards and tournaments. An issue of interest will be to investigate if
the optimal mechanism can be implemented by these mechanisms. For clarity, we formally
de¯ne these two mechanisms. A piece rate award mechanism rewards each agent based





1 . A tournament mechanism ranks the agents and rewards







We analyze the problem gradually. First, we solve the incentive design problem under
moral hazard with only the weak participation and budget constraints. The novel twist
in this analysis is to revisit the standard incentive design problem with heterogeneous
agents. Second, we investigate the problem with the strong version of these constraints.
This is the main contribution of this theoretical section.
Moral Hazard with WBC and WPC Under moral hazard, the e±cient outcome
can be achieved as long as the ICCs and the WPC hold at the e±cient level of e®ort.
Then, the WBC is implied by the WPCs. The ICCs will hold at the optimal level of
e®ort if the principal can create an award di®erential between high and low performances
large enough to provide the right e®ort incentives. The principal will be able to bind the
WPC if it can adjust the average level of performance by punishing the agent under low
performance to compensate for the high rewards under high performance.
This will typically be the case as long as the principal has enough degrees of freedom
on the 8 outcome dependent awards (w
j
i) to satisfy the 5 constraints ((ICCi, WPCi)i2I,
WBC). Many mechanisms implement the e±cient outcome but the goal of this section
is to focus on piece rate and tournament.
10We assume that when both agents achieve the same outcome, they are randomly ranked. Tournament
then implies that the total award given when agents perform the same is equal to the total award when







10To start, note that the principal cannot implement the e±cient outcome under a
\pure" tournament. A tournament o®ers a ¯xed prize schedule that is independent of
the size of contestants. The tournament's winner then earns the same prize whether it is
managing a large or a small budget. When b1 > b2, tournaments give too much incentive
to the small agent relative to the large one. This result is similar to the result in the
tournament literature that tournaments may not achieve the e±cient outcome when one
agent has a comparative cost advantage (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). The solution in these
models is to handicap the favorite agent. In our model, a simpler solution consists in a
modi¯ed tournament structure where the prize schedule is weighted by the sizes of the
agents. De¯ne a `weighted tournament' mechanism as a tournament where the winner
earns biwW and the looser b¡iwL where wW and wL are the prizes per unit of budget.
Proposition 1 Under WBC and WPC, the e±cient outcome can be implemented under
a weighted tournament system where awards are proportional to budget sizes.
A similar analysis applies to piece rate system. Although the principal cannot im-
plement the e±cient level of e®ort with a single piece rate rewarding only high and low
performances, she can implement the e±cient levels of e®ort under a weighted piece rate
system. Weighted tournament and weighted piece rate belong to a more general class of


















many weighted mechanisms that implement the e±cient outcome. The intuition is that
under a weighted incentive scheme ICC1 is equivalent to ICC2 and similarly WPC1 is
equivalent to WPC2. Therefore, the principal can achieve the e±cient outcome because
she has 4 degree of freedom (the four prizes) and must satisfy only two constraints (ICC
and WPC). Note, however, that there are some mechanisms that do not satisfy the
condition for a `weighted mechanism' and that still implement the e±cient outcome.11
Moral Hazard with SBC and SPC Let's now turn to the design problem with the










2 ) = b1
b2. This condition says that prizes have to be weighted but only in an av-
erage sense.
11strong budget and participation constraints. The incentive design problem is,











To start, we consider the relaxed incentive design problem (RID) where we take into
account only the inequality d
deiWi(e1;e2) ¸ bic0(ei) from the ICCs. It will be easy to
check that the principal can still implement the optimal RID pro¯ts when the reverse
inequalities are imposed.





1 , SBChh, SBChl, and SBClh bind (hold as equality) and
SPChl
1 , SPClh
2 , and SBCll do not bind.
To provide e®ort incentives, the principal tries to create the largest award di®erential
between high and low performances. This has straightforward implications for the states
of the world where only one agent performs well. The agent who does not perform
gets her reservation utility while the agent who does perform get the rest of the award
pot. Similarly, when both agents perform poorly they get only their reservation utilities.
Lemma 1 greatly simpli¯es the incentive design problem. In fact, we can replace, or get
rid of, most of the constraints and are left only with ICC1, ICC2, SPChh
1 , and SPChh
2 .
De¯ne the simpli¯ed relaxed incentive design problem as,






where the all award prizes but whh
2 have been replaced using Lemma 1. Let ¸c represent
the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint c.
Lemma 2 ¸SPChh
1 = 0 and ¸ICC1 > 0 in the optimal SRID contract.
The large agent is the one who is di±cult to motivate. The incentive compatibility
constraint will always bind for that agent. Similarly, that agent will always receive more
than its reservation utility when both agents are performing high. The intuition is simple.
12The small agent gets a disproportionaly large award when she is the only high performer.
Therefore, the small agent is facing stronger incentives than the large one from the way the
award pot is distributed when there is only one high performer. This has to be balanced
if one wants the two agents to provide the same e®ort and the only opportunity to over
reward the large agent is when both agents perform well. A ¯nal result will help interpret
the results.
Lemma 3 ¸SPChh
2 = 0 , e1 = e2 and ¸SPChh
2 > 0 , e1 < e2.
This Lemma says that the small agent supplies more e®ort than the large one if she
just receives her reservation utility in the state of the world where both agents perform
high. The optimal incentive scheme depends on which constraints out of ICC2 and SPChh
2
bind and this in turn depends on the parameters of the model. Three mutually exhaustive
cases may occur. (A formal proof is presented in the Appendix.)
1. Contract (C1), (¸ICC2 > 0, ¸SPChh
2 = 0). The solution to SRID without SPChh
2
does satisfy SPChh
2 . Then, both agents supply the same e®ort e1 = e2. The optimal
pair (e, whh
2 ) is obtained by solving the agents' ¯rst order conditions.
2. Contract (C2), (¸ICC2 > 0, ¸SPChh
2 > 0). The small agent supplies more e®ort than
the large one and is paid her reservation utility in the state of the world where both
agents perform well whh
2 = b2(U + c(e2)). The small agent's ICC binds.
3. Contract (C3), (¸ICC2 = 0, ¸SPChh
2 > 0). Again, the small agent supplies more e®ort
than the large one and is paid her reservation utility in the state of the world where
both agents perform well. The di®erence now is that the small agent's ICC does
not bind. As a consequence the awards wll
2 and wlh
2 are not uniquely determined.12
Note that the optimal contract is not uniquely determined only in contract (C3) for
the small agent and for performance outcomes lh and ll. The intuition for this result is
12The optimal SRID award scheme violates ICC2's reverse inequality. To meet that constraint, it is
necessary to lower wlh
2 and/or increase wll
2. It is possible to do so because ICC2 in SRID does not bind
so SBClh and SPCll
2 do not have to bind. Any combination of wll
2 and wlh
2 that binds ICC2 and satis¯es
SPCll
2 and SBClh implements the SRID pro¯ts and satisfy all the ID constraints.
13simple. The small agent would be facing too powerful incentive if she would receive the
entire leftover award pot (after giving the large agent her reservation utility) when she is
the only high performer and only her reservation utility when both agents perform low.
Under such powerful incentive, the small agent would supply too much e®ort relative to
the large one. Therefore, ¸ICC2 = 0. One solution to lower the small agent's e®ort is to
waste some award funds when the small agent is the only high performer. Another way to
go is to increase the small agent's award when both agent perform poorly. The principal
is indi®erent between these two options.
The Optimal Award Prizes
C1 C2 C3
whh
1 W ¡ whh
2
(a) W ¡ b2(U + c(e2)) W ¡ b2(U + c(e2))
whh
2 whh
2 b2(U + c(e2)) b2(U + c(e2))
whl
1 W ¡ b2(U + c(e)) W ¡ b2(U + c(e2)) W ¡ b2(U + c(e2))
whl
2 b2(U + c(e)) b2(U + c(e2)) b2(U + c(e2))
wlh
1 b1(U + c(e)) b1(U + c(e1)) b1(U + c(e1))
wlh




1 b1(U + c(e)) b1(U + c(e1)) b1(U + c(e1))
wll
2 b2(U + c(e)) b2(U + c(e2)) wll
2
awhh
2 solves ICC1 and ICC2 for e1 = e2.
bAny wlh
2 and wll
2 that satisfy SPCll
2 , SBClh and ICC2 at the optimal levels of e®ort (e1;e2).
Table 1 presents the optimal award prizes under the three possible contracts. In
contract (C1) when both agents are doing well, the large agent receives a larger award







intuition is that the small agent is already facing pretty strong incentives because she can
be generously rewarded when she is the only high performer. Therefore, the small agent
does not need to be rewarded as much as the large one does when both perform well.
This result will also typically hold for contracts (C2) and (C3) as long as the small agent
does not exert much more e®ort than the large one.
Table 1 shows that the principal does not always distribute the entire award pot. This
will typically occur when performance is low across the board. Burning out some award
money is the optimal punishment scheme to provide ex-ante incentives. The rational for
this outcome is that the principal cannot carry award funds from one incentive contract
to the other. Under contract (C3), the principal may even burn some award fund in the
14state of the world where only the small agent performs well.
Another implication of Table 1 is that the optimal incentive scheme cannot be im-
plemented under a (weighted) piece rate system. In fact, under a piece rate system the
small agent would receive the same prizes when she is the only high performer and when
both agents perform high. In the optimal contract, however, the small agent receives less
when both agents perform high than when she is the only high performer (wlh
2 > whh
2 ).
Similarly, a (weighted) tournament system cannot be optimal because it would entail
to sometimes reward the large agent more than its reservation utility when both agents
perform low.
The agents' awards depend not only on their performances but also on the perfor-
mances of the other agent. The reason for the optimality of group incentive in this model
with SPC and SBC constraints is distinct from the standard reason found in the in-
centive literature. The traditional reason is that group incentives allow the principal to
better insure the agents against performance risk when the measures of performance are
stochastically related across agents. This is also known as Holmstrom's (1979) informa-
tiveness principle. In this model, agents are risk-neutral and group incentives are optimal
even when the performance outcomes are independent across agents. The reason for the
optimality of group incentives here comes from the need to cross-subsidize performance
rewards in order to increase the award di®erential in the presence of the strong budget
constraint.
In the empirical section, we want to investigate how the optimal contract changes
as agents are more heterogeneous and as total budget changes. To investigate this issue
theoretically we assume that the budgets are b1 = ¹ b+¢b and b2 = ¹ b¡¢b with ¹ b > ¢b > 0.
To control for scale e®ects, we will assume that W = f¹ b so that the award pot increases
proportionally with budget.
Proposition 2 There exist 0 < ¢¤ < ¢¤¤ < 1 such that (C1) is optimal for
¢b
¹ b < ¢¤,
(C2) is optimal for ¢¤ <
¢b
¹ b < ¢¤¤, and (C3) is optimal for
¢b
¹ b > ¢¤¤.
This Proposition together with Lemma 3 implies that e1 = e2 for ¢¤ ¸
¢b
¹ b while
e1 < e2 for
¢b
¹ b ¸ ¢¤. When agents are heterogeneous enough, the small agent exerts more
15e®ort than the large one. This will happen if the award system over-rewards the small
agent when she is the only high performer so much that this cannot be compensated by
under-rewarding her when both agents perform well. The principal will not be able to
level incentives across agents when the agents' budgets are too heterogeneous. Note that
the proper measure of agent heterogeneity is relative budget di®erence scaled by mean
budget. Budget di®erences matter more when mean budget is lower. Put di®erently, the
larger the average award pot, the easier it is for the principal to compensate for budget
heterogeneity. The ¯nal result regards the average level of prizes and the average level of
performance.
Proposition 3 The small agent is more likely to perform high than the large one. The




We conclude with a comment on the welfare implications of the model. The SPC
and SBC are source of two kinds of distortions. First, the optimal incentive system does
not always allocate e®ort optimaly across agents. When agents are too heterogeneous,
the large one exerts too little e®ort and the small one too much e®ort. Second, even
contract C1 does not achieve the e±cient outcome although it does satisfy the condition
that both agents supply the same level of e®ort (e1 = e2). There are two reasons for
that. One reason is that the SBCs force the principal to throw away award funds when
both agents perform poorly.13 Another reasons is that the agents receive more than their
expected reservation utility under SPC. As a consequence, agents exert less e®ort under
SPC and SBC than under WPC and WBC. Note that the ine±ciency of having the SBC
and the SPC is not driven by one of these constraints alone. In fact, the principal would
be better-o® with SBC and WPC or with WBC and SPC than with SBC and SPC. Both
the limited liability and the fully funded constraints bind.
Extensions The most crucial assumption in the model is the assumption that there are
no (dis)economies of scale in budget size. To investigate the role this assumption, we
13To the extent that the award money could be used for other activities than agent compensation, the
e±ciency impact of this distortionary e®ect could be mitigated and really depends on the value of these
other activities. Interestingly, the JTPA incentive system anticipated that potential problem and created
a \technical assistance" fund. States are allowed to channel some of the award money to the technical
assistance fund to help poorly performing training agencies.
16assume that the cost function is not linear in budget (@2C
@2b 6= 0) and consider how this
would change the optimal contracts and the levels of e®ort. Assuming diseconomies of
scale in budget @2C
@2b > 0 would add a force pushing toward requiring more e®ort from the
small agent relative to the large one while assuming economies of scale in budget @2C
@2b < 0
would push toward relatively less e®ort from the small agent. Under moral hazard with
SPC and SBC these e®ects would just add to the incentive e®ect we identi¯ed in the
analysis.
It is clear that it would be impossible to identify the incentive e®ect in a single contract
environment without knowing anything about the cost function. This is not true, however,
if one has access to a cross section of contracts that cover di®erent pools of agents. To
illustrate this point, assume for example, that there are two pairs of agents where the
large agent in one pair is the same size as the small agent in the other pair. Then, a
simple extension of the model would predict that although these two agents are identical,
they should receive di®erent awards when they perform well and their paired agent also
do so. In such event, the agent that is paired with a larger agent should receive a smaller
award than the one that is paired with a smaller one. All the other predictions of the
model can also be identi¯ed.
Another important assumption of the model is that there are only two agents. To
simplify, consider the case of four agents corresponding to two identical pairs of agent and
let's compare this four-agent case (two pairs) with the corresponding two-agent case (one
pair). In the four-agent case, the distortion e®ect identi¯ed in the two-agent case will be
less pronounced because the principal will have more degree of freedom to smooth the
award function across agents. In addition, the performance outcome where all agents per-
form poorly will occur less frequently implying that the principal will burn out the award
pot less frequently. These two forces imply that average performance should increase with
the number of agents.
175 Application to the JTPA Incentive System
In this section we test whether states implement the optimal award scheme. The theo-
retical model establishes how the agents' awards should depend upon their budgets and
upon their performances. The theoretical model also makes predictions about how the
award distribution and the performance outcomes should vary across states that supervise
di®erent agent pools. We test the following predictions of the optimal incentive system:
1. Award as a function of budget|An agent that is small relative to the average
agent in the state receives disproportionally large awards, given its performance.
States should distribute on average less than their entire award pot.
2. Award as a function of performance|The agent's award should depend posi-
tively on its performances but negatively on the performance of other agents within
the same incentive system.
3. Performance as a function of budget|Smaller agents should perform better
on average than larger ones. States that are more heterogeneous should perform
worse.
To test these implications we use data that contain information on performance out-
comes on the seven DOL measures, on awards and on budgets. Depending on the pre-
diction we are testing, our unit of observation is either a training agency or a state. Our
two data sources were presented in footnote 3. From the SRI data set, we have ¯nancial
data for approximately 400 of the training agencies in ¯scal years 1985 and 1986. For
about 42 states, we have a signi¯cant fraction of the agents. The sample we work with
represents only about two thirds of the JTPA population of training agencies (recall that
there are over 600 training agencies in JTPA) primarily because many training agencies
failed to report their awards and/or their budgets. In addition, we have agency perfor-
mance outcomes and standards for most agencies between 1984 and 1988 from the JASR
data set. Broadly speaking, our testing strategy is to examine whether incentive theory
predicts how awards are distributed and how agents respond to awards in JTPA.
18Award as a function of budget|We begin by testing how the agent's budget in°u-
ences its award. In this reduced form approach we focus on the predictions that (a) larger
agents should receive larger awards and (b) agents who are relatively small in their states
should receive disproportionately larger awards. Model I in Table 4 regresses award on
budget. Model I shows that the award rises on average 4 cents for a 1 dollar increase in
budget. (The coe±cient estimate is statistically signi¯cant.) Model II in Table 4 adds
to the right hand side of the regression the mean budget in the agent's state. The mean
budget picks up the e®ect of the agent's relative size.
Several implications can be drawn from the two regressions in Table 4. First, note
that the intercept, which is positive and signi¯cant in Model I, is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero in Model II. This says that states do not give ¯xed prizes independently of size.
Second, the coe±cient estimate on mean budget is signi¯cant and positive, indicating that
agents that are large relative to their state peers earn less. These results are consistent
with the thrust of the theory.
Award as a function of performance|In testing for budget e®ects, we concentrate on
the determinants of scaled awards or awards per unit of budget. Table 5 explores the im-
plications of the model by examining the e®ects of performance, and performance relative
to the performance of other agents in the state, on the award as a fraction of the budget.
The regressions in Table 5 include on the right hand side measures of excess performance,
the agent's performance outcome minus the corresponding performance standard. The
wage and cost measures in the excess performance calculations are denominated in dol-
lars. The employment rate and youth positive termination rate measures are multiplied
by 100.14
In these regressions, the right-hand side contains seven measures of agent excess
performance.15 Recall that the incentive system rewards cost outcomes only when they
are exceeded by the cost standard. For the sake of consistency, we compute excess perfor-
mance for the two cost measures, CE and CEY, as the performance standard minus the
14For example, the excess adult employment rate measure for an agent who produces a year-end
employment rate of 70 percent and faces a standard of 67 percent, is calculated as 70 ¡ 67 = 3.
15Each performance measure must receives a positive weight in the determination of the agent's award.
19outcome. That way, if the regression is correctly speci¯ed, and each performance outcome
matters for the award, we should ¯nd that the coe±cient estimates on excess performance
are positive.
Because we have a two-year panel for each agent, we estimate the relationship using
a random e®ects model, i.e., with separate, agent-speci¯c disturbances. All regressions
reported include state dummies to control for state variation in other dimensions of the
incentive system that a®ect award size. We build the model in two steps. We ¯rst
investigate the role of performance, and then investigate the role of relative performance
in the determination of the award size.
Model I contains on the right-hand side only measures of excess performance. The
coe±cient estimates for the average wage at placement measure, the adult cost measure,
and the youth employment measure have the predicted signs and are statistically signif-
icant by conventional signi¯cance criteria. To understand the impact of performance on
the award implied by these point estimates, consider the average agent whose budget is
equal to $3 million (the approximate mean budget in our sample). A $100 reduction in
the cost per placement relative to the cost standard raises the agent's award by approxi-
mately $3,300. A 10 cent increase in the wage at placement relative to the wage standard
raises the agent's award by $14,100. A 10 point increase in the agent's youth placement
rate relative to the standard raises the agent's award by $3,600. These ¯gures correspond
to arc award elasticities of .37, .97 and .25, respectively.16
Model II investigates whether awards are determined by relative performance. On
the right hand side, we add to the agent's own excess performance the mean values of
excess performance in the agent's state. Negative coe±cients on the mean values indicate
that agents are paid more when the other agents in their state do worse. Here we are
testing the model's predictions that the states construct group incentives. The coe±cient
estimates on the mean values of excess performance in the average wage at placement and
the youth cost measures both have the predicted sign and are signi¯cant (the p values
16Another relevant measure is the budget elasticity to performance. These elasticities are about fourteen
times smaller since the award represents only about eight percent of the budget. Although these elasticities
may seem small, they are not when compared to similar measures estimated from executive compensation
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
20of the two-tailed tests of signi¯cance are .004 and .001, respectively). Consider again the
agent with a budget equal to the system average of $3 million per year. Independent of the
agent's absolute average wage at placement (youth cost per placement) outcome, the agent
wins approximately an extra $27,000 ($8,400) when its wage (youth cost per placement)
outcome relative to the state average increases by 10 cents (decrease by $100).17
A surprising ¯nding that emerges from Table 5 is that not all performance measures
are signi¯cant. Related to that result, we also ¯nd that the explanatory variables do not
explain much of the variation in award per unit of budget. The R2 for Model I is about
.256. As a benchmark, the state dummies alone (this regression is not reported) explain
about 13 percent of the total variation in the award per unit of budget. Thus, while
the R2 is low in the model, excess performance accounts for nearly half of the explained
variation in the award per unit of budget. The addition of the mean values of excess
performance in Model II only modestly raise the R2 (from 25.6 percent to 27.8 percent).
The statistical insigni¯cance of some coe±cients on excess performance and more gen-
erally, their limited explanatory power, have three possible causes. First, most award
policies are highly nonlinear and complex. The low R2 may re°ect that the linear speci¯-
cation imposed in the regressions does not capture well how performance determines the
award. Second, an accurate measure of the relationship between award and performance
may be di±cult to obtain due to measurement error. Administrative data from JTPA
data sources are known to contain considerable error.18 Third, states may be using award
funds to meet political objectives rather than incentive objectives as assumed in our model.
For example, states may use award funds to redistribute resources to politically-favored
agents, or from one geographical area to the other.
Performance as a function of budget|The model predicts that smaller agents should
exert more e®ort and achieve higher levels of performance. The estimates reported in
17These ¯ndings are consistent with the model but they are also consistent with the hypothesis that the
contracts use relative performance to control for common shocks. Our data does not reject the hypothesis
that performance is statistically related within states.
18For example, for ¯scal year 1986, the JASR and the SRI data set contain measures of the same
performance outcomes and standards. These measures are frequently di®erent, and in non-systematic
ways.
21Table 6 test this hypothesis. Table 6 presents estimates of the determinants of performance
with respect to each of the seven performance measures. Table 6 is divided into 7 panels,
a panel for each of the seven performance measures. As in Table 5, the dependent variable
is de¯ned as excess performance de¯ned as the performance outcome minus the standard
for the non-cost measures and the opposite for the cost measures.
To test whether small agents perform better than large ones, we construct a measure
of relative size that is equal to the di®erence between the agent's budget and the mean
budget for its state, normalized by the mean budget.19 We include the budget variable
to control for scale e®ect in the production of the performance outcome. Having done
so, we can be sure that the coe±cient on the relative budget measure picks up only the
performance e®ect of the agent's size relative to the size of its peers in the state.
Consider ¯rst Model I. In the adult employment rate regression (Panel A), the coef-
¯cient on the relative budget measure is negative and signi¯cant by conventional criteria
(the p value is .09). A negative and signi¯cant estimate in this speci¯cation is consis-
tent with our hypothesis that because they receive stronger incentives, small agents will
generate greater outcomes. We ¯nd negative but insigni¯cant coe±cients on the relative
budget variable for the adult welfare employment rate (Panel B), the adult wage at ter-
mination (Panel D), and the youth positive termination rate (Panel G) regressions. The
coe±cients on relative budget size are positive for both cost measure regressions (Panels
C and E) and signi¯cant for the youth cost measure (its p value is .04). This later ¯nding
is inconsistent with the predictions of the model.
A prediction of the model is that relative size should be more important in states where
agents are more heterogeneous. Model II estimates separate coe±cients on the relative
budget size measure for agents in highly heterogeneous states. We use as a measure of
state heterogeneity the standard deviation of budget divided by the total allocation of the
state. We divide the standard deviation by the state allocation to capture the idea that
the larger the agents in a state, the smaller the distortion caused by a given amount of
19All regressions include state dummies to control for state variation in the other dimensions of the
incentive system (e.g., state-speci¯c modi¯cations to the construction of the performance standard).
22spread in budget sizes.20 For Model II, we de¯ne three indicator variables: ±lt25 is equal
to one if the heterogeneity measure of the agent's state falls in the lower 25th percentile
of the distribution of state heterogeneity outcomes, and equal to zero otherwise. ±2575 is
equal to one if the heterogeneity measure falls between the 25th and 75th percentiles, and
equal to zero otherwise. ±gt75 is equal to one if the heterogeneity measure exceeds the 75th
percentile, and equal to zero otherwise. The theoretical model predicts that the relative
size should have a more pronounced e®ect on performance the greater the heterogeneity
in the state. Therefore, the coe±cient estimates on B¡B
B ¢ ±2575 and B¡B
B ¢ ±gt75 in Model
II are more likely to be more negative than the coe±cient on B¡B
B alone in Model I.
We ¯nd negative and signi¯cant coe±cient estimates for the variable B¡B
B ¢±2575 for both
adult employment measures (the p values are .09 and .08, respectively; Panels A and B).21
Coe±cient estimates were negative and insigni¯cant for the adult wage measure (Panel
D) and the youth positive termination rate measure (Panel F). Again, the coe±cients
estimates from the cost regressions were positive, contradicting the model. (In the adult
cost regression, the coe±cient estimate on B¡B
B ¢±gt75 is signi¯cant, and in the youth cost
regression, the coe±cient estimate on B¡B
B ¢ ±lt25 is signi¯cant.) Taken at face value, the
evidence that relatively small agents face stronger incentives is mixed.
In Table 7, we test whether states that are more heterogeneous perform worse. For
our measure of state performance, we compute a weighted average of excess performance,
where the weights are the agents' relative sizes. Our measure of heterogeneity is once
again the standard deviation of budget size, normalized by the state's budget allocation.
We enter on the right hand side the mean budget in the state, to control for any separate
scale e®ect. We estimate the relationship between a state's size distribution and the
weighted performance measures using a panel of between 40 to 50 states for ¯scal years
20The model does not clearly specify how one should measure heterogeneity when there are more than
two agents. We chose to divide the standard deviation in budget by the sum of budgets rather than
by the average budget to capture the idea that a greater number of agents will provide the state more
degrees of freedom with which to smooth the award function. In any event, we tried di®erent measure of
heterogeneity and they give similar results.
21The regression estimates shown in Table 6 suggest that relative size matters more in more heteroge-
neous states, that is, that the coe±cient on B¡B
B interacted with the heterogeneity measure is negative.
We have conducted this test formally. While the point estimate of such a test is more often than not
negative, we always reject the hypothesis at conventional levels of signi¯cance.
231984 through 1988.
As in Table 6 we estimate 7 separate regressions, one for each performance measure.
Model I includes only the budget. Model II contains both the budget and the budget
heterogeneity variable, de¯ned as before. Considering Model II, the coe±cients on the
heterogeneity variable in ¯ve of the seven regressions are negative, as predicted. The
coe±cient is both negative and signi¯cant in the youth cost and youth employment re-
gressions (Panels E and G). In the two adult employment rate regressions (Panels A and
B) the coe±cients are positive, but insigni¯cant. Table 7 therefore presents weak evidence
consistent with the model: states with more heterogeneous sets of agents perform worse
with respect to the performance measures.
To summarize, the evidence provides some con¯rmation of the theory's implication
for how awards should depend on budgets and performance and how performance should
depend on pool composition. We ¯nd the following. First, we ¯nd that the scale prediction
holds: larger agents receive larger awards. We also ¯nd that relative size matter: agents
that are small relative to their state average receive larger awards. Second, we ¯nd that
while the relationship is not as strong as we would expect, an agent's award is determined
by its performance. This ¯nding implies that a real incentive exists, and that awards
are not fully determined by political or equity concerns. Third, we ¯nd some evidence
that a high-performing agent's award is even higher when the other agents in the state
perform poorly although again this evidence is not as widespread as it could be. Thus
the award function depends on relative performance in a way that is consistent with
the theory. Fourth, we ¯nd that for some performance measures, relatively small agents
perform better than large ones. This ¯nding is consistent with the major implication of
the model: that smaller agents face stronger incentives than larger ones. This evidence
is mixed, however. For cost measures, relatively larger agents appear to generate higher
outcomes, even after controlling for scale e®ects. Fifth, we ¯nd some evidence that e®ort
distortions are greater in states with greater size disparities among agents. We also ¯nd
that relatively heterogeneous states perform worse than relatively homogeneous states for
some measures of performance.
246 Conclusion
This paper studies the provision of incentives in a large federal job training organization
for the disadvantaged. In this organization, each state develops a ¯nancially-backed in-
centive system, subject to the constraint that the individual awards cannot be negative
(limited liability constraint) and the sum of the awards cannot exceed a ¯xed award pot
(fully funded constraint). With this pot, states reward a pool of training agencies that typ-
ically manage di®erent budgets. The training agencies are evaluated on the basis of their
performance relative to a ¯xed set of performance standards. The states have considerable
discretion in the construction of the incentive schemes. Piece rates and tournaments, for
example, are allowed.
We show that in the presence of the limited liability and fully funded constraints on the
award distribution, the optimal award function will not in general elicit the unconstrained
e±cient level of e®ort from the agents. The optimal award scheme `over rewards' small
agents relative to large ones. Because small agents receive relatively large awards, they
put forth ine±ciently high levels of e®ort. We ¯nd strong evidence consistent with the
prediction that smaller agencies receive greater rewards and mixed evidence that smaller
agents exert more e®ort. As predicted, we ¯nd some evidence that ine±ciencies are
greater in states that are more heterogeneous. Our evidence suggests that constraints on
the award distribution lower the overall e®ectiveness of performance incentives.
Our analysis suggests that the e®ectiveness of performance incentive depends on the
constraints organizations face. Not all organizations have to distribute a ¯xed award
pot to a pool of agents. In many incentive relationships, there is a surplus to be shared
(e.g. peasants and landlords share crops, executives and stockholders share stock market
value creation, and ¯rms and sales people share sales margins). It is only when there is
nothing to be shared that the principal prefers to set aside an award pot rather than, for
example, taking the risk of committing to a subjective award formula that may lead the
incentive system to bankruptcy. In that respect, the ¯xed award pot feature distinguishes
the incentive design problem that prevails in government organizations.
From a positive point of view, the analysis suggests that the sorting of agents into
25pools is an important step in the design of incentive systems. In the same way that
grading on a curve works well only in large classes, the use of ¯xed award pots works
better in large and homogeneous pools. Along the same lines, note that incentives would
be more e®ective if states could transfer some of the award pot from one year to the other,
thereby relaxing the fully funded constraint, or if states could punish agents by lowering
their budgets when they perform poorly, thereby relaxing the limited liability constraint.
Any of these solutions to the design challenge we uncovered, however, introduces practical
problems of their own.
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28Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: First I show by contradiction that pure tournament system cannot
implement the e±cient level of e®ort when b1 > b2. Assume the opposite. Under the e±cient
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These condition imply e2 > e1. A contradiction. QED
Next, de¯ne the per-unit of budget tournament prizes,
(
1




1)(wW + wL) + phl
1 wW + plh
1 wL = c0(efb)
A solution to this system always exists. The tournament prizes where the winner earns biwW
and the looser b¡iwL satisfy the ICCs and WPCs at the e±cient level of e®ort. The WBC is
implied by the WPCs.
Proof of Lemma 1: The proof goes by contradiction. Assume for example that SPCll
1 does
not bind, i.e., wll
1 > b1(U + c(e1)). Consider a new contract where wll
1 is decreased such that
SPCll
1 binds. SBCll and ICC1 still hold while all the other constraints are unchanged. A
contradiction. The same reasoning applies to show that there is an optimal contract where
SPCll
2, SPChl
2 , and SPClh
1 bind. Next, we show that SBChh also binds. Assume it does not.
Consider a new contract where whh
1 is increased such that SBChh binds. SPChh
1 and ICC1 still
hold while all other constraints are unchanged. A contradiction. A similar argument shows that
SBChl and SBClh also bind. Next, we show that SPChl
1 does not bind. Assume it does, that
is, whl
1 = b1(U + c(e1)). Because SPChl
2 and SBChl bind b1(U + c(e1)) + b2(U + c(e2)) = W.
This implies that w
j
i = bi(U +c(ei)) for i 2 I and j 2 J. ICCi imply that ei = 0 for i 2 I. But
k ¡ U > guaranties that there is a solution with positive e®orts. A contradiction. The same
reasoning shows that SPClh
2 does not bind. Finally, we show that SBCll does not bind. Assume
it does bind, that is, wll
1 + wll
2 = W. Since SPCll
1 and SPCll
2 bind, we have w
j
i = bi(U + c(ei))
for i 2 I and j 2 J. Again a contradiction. QED
Proof of Lemma 2: We focus on solutions with positive e®orts for both agents. The RSID
problem is,




1 (W ¡ whh
2 ) + phl
1 (W ¡ b2(U + c(e2))) + (plh
1 + pll




2 (W ¡ b1(U + c(e1))) +(phl
2 + pll
2)b2(U + c(e2)) ¸ b2c0(e2)
(SPChh
1 ) W ¡ whh
2 ¸ b1(c(e1) + U)
(SPChh
2 ) whh
2 ¸ b2(c(e2) + U)
29The ¯rst order condition to RSID are
FOCe1 1 + ¸ICC1(plh
1 +pll
1)c0(e1) ¡ ¸ICC2plh
2 c0(e1) ¡ ¸ICC1c00(e1) ¡ ¸SPChh
1 c0(e1) = 0
FOCe2 1 + ¸ICC2(phl
2 +pll
2)c0(e2) ¡ ¸ICC1phl
1 c0(e2) ¡ ¸ICC2c00(e2) ¡ ¸SPChh







Consider ¯rst the case ¸ICC2 > 0. We show by contradiction that ¸SPChh
1 > 0 and ¸SPChh
2 =
0 is impossible. Assume this is true. ¸SPChh
1 > 0 implies whh












b2 (W ¡ b1(U + c(e1)) ¡ b2(U + c(e2))) >
phl
1
b1 (W ¡ b1(U + c(e1)) ¡ b2(U + c(e2))) >




2 > 0 and the symmetry property saying that phh
1 = phh
2 implies
that ¸ICC2 > ¸ICC1. Replace ¸SPChh
1 in FOCe1 and substract FOCe1 and FOCe2 gives after
using the symmetry properties for the marginal probabilities,
¸ICC1(phl
1 (c0(e2) ¡ c0(e1)) ¡ c00(e1)) = ¸ICC2((phh
1 + phl
1 )(c0(e1) ¡ c0(e2)) ¡ c00(e2)):
Since (phh
1 + phl
1 )(c0(e1) ¡ c0(e2)) ¡ c00(e2) < 0, ¸ICC2 > ¸ICC1 implies after simpli¯cations,
(2phl
1 + phh
1 )c0(e2) + c00(e2) < (2phl
1 + phh
1 )c0(e1) + c00(e1):
The above inequality implies e1 > e2. A Contradiction.
Next, we show by contradiction that ¸SPChh
1 > 0 and ¸SPChh
2 > 0 is impossible. This would
imply that W = (b1 + b2)U + b1c(e1) + b2c(e2). Then, w
j
i = bi(U + c(ei)) for i 2 I and j 2 J
and ei = 0. A contradiction.
Finally, we turn to the case ¸ICC2 = 0. Assume ¸SPChh




1 > 0 and ¸SPChh
2 > 0 imply w
j
i = bi(U + c(ei)) for i 2 I and j 2 J and ei = 0. A
contradiction.
This establishes the Lemma's ¯rst claim, ¸SPChh
1 = 0. To establish the Lemma's second
claim, plug ¸SPChh
1 = 0 in FOCwhh




A contradiction since phh
2 > 0. Therefore, ¸ICC1 > 0. QED
Proof of Lemma 3: This ¯rst part of this Lemma says that the two agents supply the same
e®ort when SPChh
2 does not bind. ¸SPChh
2 = 0 imply ¸ICC1 = ¸ICC2. Taking the di®erence in




2 )c0(e1) ¡ c00(e1) = (phl
2 + pll
2 ¡ phl
1 )c0(e2) ¡ c00(e2):
After simpli¯cation, the above equation implies that e1 = e2. The second claim in the Lemma
naturally follows. QED
30Derivation of the Optimal Contract Consider ¯rst the case where ¸ICC2 > 0 and ¸SPChh
2 =
0. Then, the optimal level of e®ort and whh




1 (W ¡ whh
2 ) + (plh
1 + pll
1)b1(U + c(e)) + phl





2)b2(U +c(e)) + plh
2 (W ¡ b1(U + c(e))) = b2c0(e)
This is the solution to the optimal design problem if the optimal wage satisfy SPChh
2 , that is,
whh

































Consider next the case where ¸ICC2 > 0 and ¸SPChh
2 > 0. ¸SPChh
2 > 0 implies whh
2 =






1 )(W ¡ b2(U + c(e2))) +(plh
1 + pll




2)b2(U + c(e2)) + plh
2 (W ¡ b1(U + c(e1))) = b2c0(e2)
The ¯rst order condition to the design problem are equivalent to c00(e1) ¸ (phh
1 + phl
1 )(c0(e2) ¡
c0(e1)) and e2 ¸ e1.
The ¯nal case is ¸ICC2 = 0 and ¸SPChh
2 > 0. After replacement, one can show that the





1 )(W ¡ b2(U + c(e2))) +(plh
1 + pll
1)b1(U + c(e1)) = b1c0(e1)
c00(e1) = (phh
1 + phl
1 )(c0(e2) ¡ c0(e1))
This contract does not satisfy ICC2's reverse inequality in ID. However, the optimal pro¯ts can
be implemented under ID by increasing wll
2 and/or decreasing wlh
2 by the correct amounts so
that ICC2 holds at the optimal (C3) levels of e®orts.
Finally, from FOCwhh
2 we have ¸ICC2 = 0 ) ¸SPChh
2 > 0 implying that the case ¸ICC2 =
¸SPChh
2 = 0 is impossible. The three contracts C1, C2 and C3 are exhaustive and mutually
exclusive.
Proof of Proposition 2: De¯ne e¤ as the level of e®ort that solves the agents' ICCs in (C1).




1)(U + c(e¤)) +2phl
1 (k ¡ (U +c(e¤))) = 2c0(e¤):
The above equation shows that e¤ does not depend on ¢b
¹ b . De¯ne ¢¤ such that the agents'
ICCs hold at e¤ when whh





(f ¡ 2(U + c(e¤)):
31For ¢b





¹ b )(U +c(e)). Using ICC1 one can show that dG




< 0 Therefore, the optimal
whh
2 in C1 actually satis¯es SPChh
2 when ¢b
¹ b < ¢¤ and does not satisfy SPChh
2 when ¢b









1 )(W ¡ (¹ b ¡ ¢¤¤)(U + c(e¤
2)) ¡ (¹ b + ¢¤¤)(U +c(e¤
1))) = (¹ b + ¢¤¤)c0(e¤
1)
(plh
2 (W ¡ (¹ b ¡¢¤¤)(U + c(e¤
2)) ¡ (¹ b +¢¤¤)(U + c(e¤









¹ b = ¢¤¤, (e¤
1;e¤
2) solves both C2 and C3. Next, de¯ne H(e1;e2) = c00(e1) ¡ (phh
1 +
phl
1 )(c0(e2) ¡ c0(e1)). Using the ICCs, it is possible to show that dH
d(¢b=¹ b) < 0. For ¢b
¹ b < ¢¤¤,
H > 0 measured at the optimal C2 level of e®orts and C2 is the optimal contract. For ¢b
¹ b > ¢¤¤,
H < 0 measured at the optimal C2 level of e®orts and C3 is the optimal contract.
Finally, we show that 0 < ¢¤ < ¢¤¤ < 1. The ¯rst inequality holds because f¡2(U+c(e¤)) >
0. The second inequality holds because C1 and C3 are mutually exclusive. The third inequality






























Proof of Proposition 3: The small agent is more likely to perform high than the large agent
if
phh + plh > phh + phl:
This is equivalent to (e2 ¡ e1)(® + ¯) > 0 which is always true.







After reordering terms, this is equivalent to,
plhb1(W¡(b1+b2)(U+c(e1)))¡(phl+phh)b2(W¡(b1+b2)(U+c(e2)))+pllb1b2(c(e2)¡c(e1)) ¸ 0:




1985-86 in Effect in Measures Performance JTPA National ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Performance
Deﬁnition Name Measure _______________________________________________________________________________________
at employed terminees of Fraction Termination at Rate Employment ERT
termination
at welfare receiving terminees of Fraction at Rate Employment Welfare WERT
at employed were who application of date Termination
termination
on expenditures year’s agency’s Training Employment per Cost CE
adults of number the by divided adults
termination at employed
terminees for termination at wage Average Termination at Wage Average AWT
termination at employed were who
at employed terminees youth of Fraction at Rate Employment Youth ERTY
termination Termination
in placed either terminees youth of Fraction Rate Termination Positive Youth YPTR
objective educational an satisfying or job a
below) note (see
on expenditures year’s agency’s Training Employment per Cost Youth CEY
youths of number the by divided youths
terminated positively
_______________________________________________________________________________________
has he after enrollee an is terminee A training. exits ofﬁcially enrollee the date the is termination of date The 1.
training. exited ofﬁcially
‘‘competencies employment youth attaining employment, un-subsidized entering is termination positive A 2. "
non- entering skills), job-speciﬁc or education, basic maturity, work in tests and/or training course-work, (through
education. of level major a completing or full-time, school to returning training, JTPA2 TABLE
1985-86 in Outcomes Performance JTPA _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________ _ _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________ _
Training of Percentage Excess Mean Standard Mean Outcome Mean
(%) Standard Meeting Centers Performance
1986 1985 1986 1985 1986 1985 1986 1985 Measure Performance _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________ _
97 92 10.7 14.6 60.9 54.7 71.6 69.25 Termination at Rate Employment ERT
(8.5) (10.2) (9.5) (9.5) (13.1) (13.9)
92 89 12.1 15.3 51.1 44.8 63.1 60.0 at Rate Employment Welfare WERT
(11.4) (13.4) (8.4) (10.2) (14.4) (15.0) Termination
95 96 1495.6 1747.5 4419.2 4806.6 2923.6 3059.1 ($) Employment per Cost CE
(1108.1) (1211.8) (1071.4) (1340.2) (1190.1) (1250.5)
86 89 .4 .4 4.6 4.5 5.0 4.9 ($) Termination at Wage Average AWT
(.4) (0.5) (.8) (.7) (.9) (.9)
94 84 12.3 17.5 39.8 33.1 52.1 50.6 at Rate Employment Youth ERTY
(13.2) (12.9) (10.3) (10.5) (17.0) (16.1) Termination
72 84 6.8 3.6 73.2 73.8 80.0 77.4 Rate Termination Positive Youth YPTR
(8.9) (11.5) (10.9) (11.5) (13.3) (14.6)
90 94 1370.2 1349.0 3773.4 3865.0 2403.2 2516.0 ($) Employment per Cost Youth CEY
(1017.7) (1405.1) (962.8) (1188.6) (936.5) (1250.5)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________ _
Notes:
percentages. as deﬁned measures Rate 1.
parentheses. in deviations Standard 2.
respectively. 1986 and 1985 for calculations the in used observations 623 and 600 3.
measures). cost the for 1 minus (times outcome performance the from subtracted standard performance the is performance Excess 4.3 TABLE
1985-86 in Awards and Budgets Mean JTPA ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
1986 1985 _______________________________________________________________________________________
2,337,773 N.A. ($) Budget
(3,044,874)
119,715 178,091 ($) Award
(146,108) (258,098)
7 N.A. (%) Award/Budget
(7) _______________________________________________________________________________________
Notes:
parentheses. in deviations Standard 1.
respectively. 1986 and 1985 for calculations the in used observations 384 and 419 2.
state. the not agency, training the is Award/Budget of computation the in analysis of unit The 3.4 TABLE
Awards Agent of Determinants
($) award agent = variable Dependent





.04 .04 ($) Budget
(15.29) (21.50)
.02 ($) budget Mean
(5.52) _______________________________________________________________________________________
R2 .389 .366 _______________________________________________________________________________________
Notes:
parentheses. in stat T 1.
budget. average state the is budget Mean 2.5 TABLE
Awards Agent of Determinants
Award/Budget Agent = Variable Dependent ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
II I
val. p Coef. val. p Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.7215 -.0178 .7002 -.0156 Constant
(-.357) (-.385)
ERT∆ .6312 .2831E-3 .4072 .4673E-3
(.480) (.829)
WERT∆ .4798 .2801E-3 .3166 .3828E-3
(.707) (1.002)
CE∆ .0013 .1189E-4 .0017 .1091E-4
(3.226) (3.141)
AWT∆ .0000 .0560 .0000 .0469
(6.241) (5.453)
ERTY∆ .0002 .1136E-2 .0001 .1182E-2
(3.735) (4.020)
YPTR∆ .9365 .1880E-4 .9577 -.2006E-4
(.046) (-.053)
CEY∆ .4227 .3165E-5 .9036 .4415E-6
(.802) (.121)
ERT  ∆ .9474 .1681E-3
(.066)
WERT  ∆ .1056 .2469E-2
(1.618)
CE  ∆ .5568 -.6361E-5
(-.588)
AWT   ∆ .0041 -.0888
(-2.870)
ERTY   ∆ .8273 .3262E-3
(.218)
YPTR   ∆ .7215 -.0178
(.831)
CEY   ∆ .0102 -.2825E-4
(-2.570) _______________________________________________________________________________________
R2 .2775 .2558 _______________________________________________________________________________________
Notes:
802. = Obs. Report. Status Annual JTPA the and NCEP-SRI from Data 1.
regres- All disturbances. agent-speciﬁc separate with i.e., model, effects random one-way a using estimated II and I 2.
parentheses. in are statistics T omitted. are estimates coefﬁcient whose dummies, state include sions
3. ERT∆ , WERT∆ , AWT∆ , ERTY∆ and , YPTR∆ perfor- the minus outcome performance agent’s the as deﬁned are
standard. mance CE∆ and CEY∆ standard. performance the minus outcome performance the times -1 as deﬁned are
means. state of measures are bars with Variables6 TABLE
A-C Panels
Performance Agent of Determinants
standard - outcome Perf. = Variable Dependent
1
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
II Model I Model _______________________________________________________________________________________
A. ERT Rate: Employment Adult Excess of Determinants ∆ _______________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.023 (2.273) .892 .724 (.354) 1.543 Constant
B .175 (1.357) 2.41E-07 .195 (1.295) 2.25E-07
(B− B  )⁄B  .087 (-1.712) -.848
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ lt25 .285 (-1.068) -.801
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ 2575 .092 (-1.687) -1.018
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ gt75 .160 (-1.406) -.774 _______________________________________________________________________________________
1973 2011 Obs.
R2 .1709 .1785 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
B. WERT Rate: Employment Welfare Adult Excess of Determinants ∆ _______________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.048 (1.979) 10.434 .236 (1.185) 8.608 Constant
B .225 (1.214) 2.92E-07 .293 (1.063) 2.48E-07
(B− B  )⁄B  .167 (-1.363) -.933
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ lt25 .367 (-.903) -.911
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ 2575 .080 (-1.750) -.1.429
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ gt75 .373 (-.891) -.669 _______________________________________________________________________________________
1946 1963 Obs.
R2 .1486 .1496 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
C. CE Employment: per Cost Adult Excess of Determinants ∆ _______________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.053 (1.936) 899.683 .078 (1.765) 1013.963 Constant
B .031 (1.241) -2.93E-05 .099 (1.652) -3.83E-05
(B− B  )⁄B  .130 (1.575) 100.230
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ lt25 .169 (1.375) 135.426
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ 2575 .917 (.104) 8.380
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ gt75 .066 (1.840) 134.729 _______________________________________________________________________________________
1912 1950 Obs.
R2 .1654 .1691 _______________________________________________________________________________________
(Continued)(Continued) 6 TABLE
D-F Panels ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
II Model I Model _______________________________________________________________________________________
D. AWT Rate: Wage Adult Excess of Determinants ∆ _______________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.112 (1.590) .564 .478 (.709) .3431 Constant
B .434 (.783) 1.26E-08 .578 (.556) 8.75E-09
(B− B  )⁄B  .299 (-1.039) -.046
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ lt25 .588 (.542) -.037
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ 2575 .175 (-1.356) -.074
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ gt75 .193 (-1.301) -.065 _______________________________________________________________________________________
1952 1989 Obs.
R2 .0824 .0919 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
E. ERTY Rate: Employment Youth Excess of Determinants ∆ _______________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.000 (3.773) 20.268 .225 (1.213) 7.220 Constant
B .163 (-1.397) -3.60E-07 .106 (-1.618) -4.07E-07
(B− B  )⁄B  .358 (.918) .651
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ lt25 .332 (.971) 1.010
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ 2575 .791 (.265) .229
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ gt75 .364 (.908) .714 _______________________________________________________________________________________
1882 1918 Obs.
R2 .1701 .1713 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F. YPTR Rate: Termination Positive Youth Excess of Determinants ∆ _______________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.680 (.413) 1.882 .856 (-.181) -1.130 Constant
B .365 (.905) 1.89E-07 .311 (1.012) 2.07E-07
(B− B  )⁄B  .828 (-.217) -.125
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ lt25 .674 (.426) .374
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ 2575 .826 (.220) .156
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ gt75 .470 (-.722) -.463 _______________________________________________________________________________________
1918 1952 Obs.
R2 .1245 .1352 _______________________________________________________________________________________
(Continued)(Continued) 6 TABLE
G Panel ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
II Model I Model _______________________________________________________________________________________
G. CEY Employment: per Cost Youth Excess of Determinants ∆ _______________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _______________________________________________________________________________________
.000 (5.204) 2351.686 .000 (4.416) 2270.172 Constant
B .297 (-1.043) -1.95E-05 .164 (-1.393) -2.55E-05
(B− B  )⁄B  .041 (2.044) 107.199
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ lt25 .007 (2.695) 211.751
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ 2575 .374 (.889) 57.396
(B− B  )⁄B  .δ gt75 .124 (1.539) 89.866 _______________________________________________________________________________________
1735 1763 Obs.
R2 .1657 .1727 _______________________________________________________________________________________
Footnote:
1 measures cost the For CE∆ and CEY∆ outcome. - standard performance as deﬁned is variable dependent the ,
Notes:
Report. Status Annual JTPA the and NCEP-SRI from are Data 1.
disturbances. agent-speciﬁc separate with i.e., model, effects random one-way a using estimated are II and I Models 2.
omitted. are estimates coefﬁcient whose dummies, state include regressions All
variables The 3. B and B  respectively. budget, mean state and budget agent’s the are δ
lt25 equal variable, indicator an is
state of distribution the of percentile 25th lower the in falls state agent’s the of measure heterogeneity the if one to
otherwise; zero to equal and outcomes, heterogeneity δ 2575 the between falls measure heterogeneity the if one to equal is
and otherwise; zero to equal and percentiles, 75th and 25th δ gt75 the exceeds measure heterogeneity the if one to equal is
otherwise. zero to equal and percentile, 75th7 TABLE
A-D Panels
Performance State of Determinants
Performance Excess Mean State = Variable Dependent
1
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
II Model I Model ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
A. ERT Rate: Employment Adult Excess Mean State of Determinants  ∆ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
0.003 (3.016) 7.693 .000 (4.770) 11.692 Constant
.002 (3.108) 5.94e-07 .267 (1.110) 1.88e-07 budget Mean
.413 (.818) 3.391 heterogeneity Budget ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
215 254 Obs.
R2 .3585 .4076 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
B. WERT Rate: Employment Welfare Adult Excess Mean State of Determinants  ∆ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
.011 (2.544) 8.265 .000 (3.874) 14.167 Constant
.000 (3.640) 9.18e-07 .680 (-0.412) -1.09e-07 budget Mean
.473 (.718) 3.926 heterogeneity Budget ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
215 254 Obs.
R2 .4285 .3692 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
C. CE Employment: per Cost Adult Excess Mean State of Determinants  ∆ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
.000 (4.028) 1674.351 .000 (4.926) 2028.693 Constant
.288 (1.063) 3.85E-05 .297 (-1.042) -3.38E-05 budget Mean
.524 (-0.637) -499.8737 heterogeneity Budget ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
215 254 Obs.
R2 .3581 .3568 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
D. AWT Rate: Wage Adult Excess Mean State of Determinants   ∆ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
.000 (5.008) .705 .000 (19.989) 2.684 Constant
.022 (-2.296) -2.79e-08 .000 (-10.830) -1.18e-07 budget Mean
.126 (-1.529) -.403 heterogeneity Budget ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
215 254 Obs.
R2 .4849 .6816 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ _
(Continued)(Continued) 7 TABLE
E-G Panels __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
II Model I Model _____________________________________________________________________________________________
E. ERTY Rate: Employment Youth Excess Mean State of Determinants   ∆ _____________________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _____________________________________________________________________________________________
.000 (3.926) 14.777 .181 (1.336) 4.84 Constant
.000 (4.290) 1.22E-06 .000 (3.482) 8.43E-07 budget Mean
.015 (-2.440) -15.089 heterogeneity Budget _____________________________________________________________________________________________
215 254 Obs.
R2 .3835 .3831 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F. YPTR Rate: Termination Positive Youth Excess Mean State of Determinants   ∆ _____________________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _____________________________________________________________________________________________
.972 (0.035) .097 .014 (2.459) 7.059 Constant
.002 (3.119) 7.03E-07 .283 (-1.075) -2.30E-07 budget Mean
.947 (-0.067) -.326 heterogeneity Budget _____________________________________________________________________________________________
215 254 Obs.
R2 .3228 .4160 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
G. CEY Employment: per Cost Youth Excess Mean State of Determinants   ∆ _____________________________________________________________________________________________
val p stat) (t Coef. val p stat) (t Coef. Variable _____________________________________________________________________________________________
.000 (3.907) 1757.322 .070 (1.812) 972.1862 Constant
.072 (1.797) 7.32E-05 .617 (0.501) 2.19E-05 budget Mean
.038 (-2.074) -1829.808 heterogeneity Budget _____________________________________________________________________________________________
215 254 Obs.
R2 .3595 .3657 _____________________________________________________________________________________________
Footnote:
1 measures, performance excess cost-related The CE∆ and CEY∆ performance agent’s the of averages weighted are ,
the of averages weighted are performance excess of measures other All outcome. performance the minus standard
allocation. state’s its of share its is weight agent’s The standard. performance the minus outcome performance agent’s
Notes:
Report. Status Annual JTPA the and NCEP-SRI from are Data 1.
disturbances. agent-speciﬁc separate with i.e., model, effects random one-way a using estimated are II and I Models 2.
omitted. are estimates coefﬁcient whose dummies, state include regressions All
the within size agent in variation of measure a is heterogeneity Budget budget. average state the is budget Mean 3.
deﬁnition. for text See state.